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Abstract
We characterize the optimal exploitation paths of two primary energy resources.
The first one is a non-renewable polluting resource, the second one a pollution-free
renewable resource. Both resources can supply the energy needs of two sectors. Sector
1 is able to reduce the potential carbon emissions generated by its non-renewable
energy consumption at a reasonable cost while sector 2 cannot. Another possibility
is to capture the carbon spread in the atmosphere but at a significantly higher cost.
We assume that the atmospheric carbon stock cannot exceed some given ceiling and
that this constraint is effective. We show that there may exist paths along which it is
optimal to begin by fully capturing the sector 1's potential emission flow before the
ceiling constraint begins to be effective. Also there may exist optimal paths along
which both capture devices have to be activated, in which case the potential emission
flow of sector 1 is first fully abated and next the society must resort to the atmospheric
carbon reducing device.
Keywords: Fossil resource, Carbon stabilization cap, Heterogeneity, CCS, Air
capture.
JEL classifications: Q31, Q32, Q41, Q42, Q54, Q58.
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1 Introduction
As recommended by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, abatement technolo-
gies must be used to reduce the anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions in a climate change
mitigation objective (IPCC, 2007). Among all the alternatives, a particular interest should
be given to the carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) (IPCC, 2005). CCS technology
consists in filtering CO2 fluxes at the source of emission, that is, in fossil energy-fueled
power plants, by use of scrubbers installed near the top of chimney stacks. The carbon
would be sequestered in reservoirs, such as exhausted salt and coal mines, depleted oil and
gas fields or deep saline aquifers.
Even if the efficiency of such a technology as well as the potential capacities of such
carbon sinks are still under assessment, current engineering estimates suggest that CCS
could be a credible cost-effective approach for eliminating most of the emissions from
coal and natural gas power plants (MIT, 2007). Along this line of arguments, Islegen and
Reichelstein (2009) point out that CCS has considerable potential to reduce CO2 emissions
at a social cost that most economists would consider as reasonable, given the social costs
of carbon emissions predicted for a business-as-usual scenario without regulation. For
regulated scenarios, CCS is also intended to have a major role in limiting the effective
carbon tax, that is, the market price for CO2 emission permits under a cap-and-trade
system. In that case, the crucial point is to estimate how far would the CO2 price have
to rise before the operator of power plants would find it advantageous to install CCS
technology rather then buy emission permits or pay the carbon tax. McKinsey & Company
(2007) estimates a break-even price, that is a carbon price from which CCS becomes an
economically viable alternative, in the range of $30-45 for coal-fire plants. This price rises
to at least $60 per tonne of CO2 in the case of power plants running on natural gas.
However, geologic CCS presents the disadvantage to apply to the sole large point sources
of pollution such as power plants or huge manufacturings. This technology is prohibitively
costly to filter for instance the CO2 emissions from transportation as far as the energy
input is gasoline or kerosene1, small residence heating or scattered agricultural activities.
Hence, the ultimate device to abate carbon dioxide fluxes from any concentrated as well as
diffuse sources would consist in capturing them directly from the atmosphere. Deliberately
expressing a double meaning, McKay (2009) claims about this alternative that "captur-
1Note that an electric railway system escapes this constraint.
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ing carbon dioxide from thin air is the last thing we should talk about" (p.240). On the
one hand, the energy requirements for atmospheric carbon capture are so enormous that,
according to McKay, it seems actually almost absurd to talk about it. But on the other
hand, McKay argues that "we should talk about it, contemplate how best to do it, and fund
research into how to do it better, because capturing carbon from thin air may turn out to
be our last line of defense, if climate change is as bad as the climate scientists say, and
if humanity fails to take the cheaper and more sensible options that may still be available
today" (p.240).
Technically speaking, removing carbon from the atmosphere can be achieved in different
ways. The most obvious approach consists in exploiting the process of photosynthesis. A
close idea can be transposed to the oceans. To make them able to capture carbon faster
then normal, phytoplankton blooms can be stimulated by fertilizing some oceanic iron-
limited regions. A third way is to enhance weathering of rocks, that is to pulverize rocks
that are capable of absorbing C02, and leave them in the open air. This idea can be pitched
as the acceleration of a natural process. Unfortunately, as claimed by Barrett (2009), the
effects of all these devices are difficult to verify, their potential is limited in any event, and
there are concerns about some unknown ecological consequences.
A probably most credible way of sucking carbon from thin air is to use a chemical
process. This involves a technology that brings air into contact with a chemical "sorbent"
(an alkaline liquid). The sorbent absorbs CO2 in the air, and the chemical process then
separates out the CO2 and recycles the sorbent. Finally, the captured CO2 is stored in
geologic deposits, just like the CCS from power plant described above. However, chemical
air capture is expensive. Estimates of marginal cost range from $100-200/tCO2, which
is larger than the cost of alternatives for reducing emissions such as power plant CCS.
They are also larger than current estimates of the social cost of carbon, which range from
about $7-85/tCO2. But, as concluded by Barrett (2009), bearing the cost of chemical air
capture can become profitable in the future under constraining cap-and-trade scenarios.
Furthermore, we may hope that the cost will decrease, thanks to R&D and learning by
doing.
In the present study, we address the question of the heterogeneity of energy users
regarding the way their carbon footprint can be reduced. We then consider two abatement
technologies and two sectors. The first technology is a conventional emission abatement
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device (CCS) which is available at a marginal cost assumed to be socially acceptable.
However, this abatement technology cannot apply to carbon emissions from any type of
activity, but only from large point sources of emissions. The second technology directly
captures carbon in the atmosphere. Its marginal cost is highly costlier than the emission
capture technology, but it allows to reduce carbon from any sources since the capture
process and the generation of emissions are now disconnected. The first sector, in which
pollution sources are spatially concentrated, can abate its carbon emissions, but not the
second one since energy users are too small and too scattered. The ultimate way for abating
pollution is to directly capture carbon in the atmosphere. But since the atmosphere is a
public good, this kind of pollution reduction will also benefit to sector 1. Whatever the
capture process, we assume that carbon is stockpiled into reservoirs whose size is very
large. Then, as in Chakravorty et al., (2006-b) this suggests a generic abatement scheme
of unlimited capacity2. Finally, energy in each sector can be supplied either by a carbon-
based fossil fuel, contributing to climate change (oil, cal, gas), or by a carbon-free renewable
and non biological resource such, as solar energy.
Using a standard Hotelling model for the non-renewable resource and assuming that the
atmospheric carbon stock should not exceed some critical threshold, we then characterize
the optimal time path of sectoral energy prices, sectoral energy consumptions, emission
and atmospheric abatements. The key results of the paper are: i) Irrespective of the
availability of the air capture technology, it may happen that it is optimal for the first
sector to abate its carbon emissions before the atmospheric carbon concentration cap is
attained. ii) Since this type of carbon capture is unable to filter the emissions from the
second sector, it is also optimal for the first sector to abate the totality of its own emissions,
at least at the beginning. These two first results are at variance with Chakravorty et al.
(2006-b), Lafforgue et al. (2008-a) and (2008-b) who consider a single sector using energy
and a single abatement technology. iii) The atmospheric carbon capture is only used when
the atmospheric carbon stock reaches the ceiling, maintaining the stock at its critical level.
Hence the flow of carbon captured in the atmosphere is lower than the emission flow of the
second sector.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In section 3, we lay
down the social planner program and we derive the optimality conditions. In section 4,
2The question of the size of carbon sinks and of the time profile of their filling up is addressed by
Lafforgue et al. (2008-a, 2008-b).
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we examine the restricted problem in which only the emission carbon capture device is
available. In section 5, we examine how the model reacts when the atmospheric carbon
capture technology is introduced. We also investigate the time profile of the optimal carbon
tax as well as, for each sector, the total burden induced by the mitigation of their emissions.
Finally, we briefly conclude in section 6.
2 Model and notations
Let us consider a stationary economy with two sectors, indexed by i = 1, 2, in which the
instantaneous gross surplus derived from energy consumption are the same. For an identical
energy consumption in the two sectors, q1 = q2 = q, the sectoral gross surplus u1(q) and
u2(q) are such that: u1(q) = u2(q) = u(q). We assume that this common function u
satisfies the following standard assumptions. u : R+ → R+ is a function of class C2,
strictly increasing, strictly concave and verifying the Inada conditions: limq↓0 u′(q) = +∞
and limq↑+∞ u′(q) = 0. We denote by p(q) the sectoral marginal gross surplus function
and by qd(p) = p−1(p), the sectoral direct demand function.
In each sector, energy can be supplied by two primary natural resources: a dirty non-
renewable resource (let say oil for instance) and a carbon-free renewable resource (let say
solar energy).
Let us denote by X0 the initial oil endowment of the economy, by X(t) the remain-
ing part of this initial endowment at time t, and by xi(t), i = 1, 2, the instantaneous
consumption flow of oil in sector i at time t, so that:
X˙(t) = −[x1(t) + x2(t)], with X(0) ≡ X0 and X(t) ≥ 0 (1)
xi(t) ≥ 0, i = 1, 2. (2)
The delivery cost of oil is the same for both sectors. We denote by cx the corresponding
average cost, assumed to be constant and hence equal to the marginal cost. The delivery
cost includes the extraction cost of the resource, the cost of industrial processing (refining
of the crude oil) and the transportation cost, so that the resource is ready for use by the
consumer in the concerned sector. To keep matter as simple as possible, we assume that no
oil is lost during the delivery process. Equivalently, the oil stock X(t) may be understood
as measured in ready for use units.
7
Let Z(t) be the stock of carbon within the atmosphere at time t, and Z0 be the initial
stock, Z0 ≡ Z(0). We assume that a carbon cap policy is prescribed to prevent catastrophic
damages which would be infinitely costly. This policy consists in forcing the atmospheric
stock to stay under some critical level Z¯, with Z¯ > Z0.
The atmospheric carbon stock is fed by carbon emission flows resulting from the use
of oil. Let ζ be the quantity of carbon which would be potentially released by unit of oil
consumption whatever the sector in which the oil is used. Thus, the gross pollutant flow
amounts to ζ[x1(t) + x2(t)]. However, this gross emission flow can be abated before being
released into the atmosphere. We assume that emissions from sector 1 can be abated, but
not emissions from sector 2 (or at a prohibitive cost). Emission abatement by carbon cap-
ture and sequestration (CCS) can be achieved when burning oil is spatially concentrated,
as it is the case for instance in the electricity or cement industries, which are good examples
of sector 1's activities. At the other extreme of the spectrum, i.e. in sector 2, there exists
some activities with prohibitively costing emission captures since users are too small or
too scattered. Transportation by cars, trucks and diesel train are good examples of sector
2's industry3.
Let se(t) be this part of carbon emissions from sector 1 which is captured and se-
questered at some average cost ce, assumed to be constant. Thus the net pollution flow
issued from sector 1 amounts to:
ζx1(t)− se(t) ≥ 0, se(t) ≥ 0. (3)
In sector 2, the net pollution flow amounts to ζx2(t).
Carbon emission capture is not the unique way to reduce the atmospheric carbon con-
centration. The other process consists in capturing the carbon present in the atmosphere
itself. We denote by sa(t) the instantaneous carbon flow which is abated owing to this
second device, and by ca the corresponding average cost, also assumed to be constant.
Although atmospheric carbon capture seems technically feasible, it is proved to be more
costly than emission capture: ca > ce.
4 The only constraint on this capture flow is:
sa(t) ≥ 0 (4)
3Note that electric traction trains could be good examples of sector 1 users.
4Classical devices allowing for the carbon capture and sequestration from the atmosphere consists in
increasing the forestlands and changing the agricultural processes. This is not the type of device we
consider in the present paper.
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Last, there is also some natural self regeneration effect of the atmospheric carbon stock.
We assume that the natural proportional rate of decay, denoted by α > 0, is constant.
Taking into account all the components of the dynamics of Z(t) results into:
Z˙(t) = ζ[x1(t) + x2(t)]− [sa(t) + se(t)]− αZ(t), Z(0) ≡ Z0 < Z¯ (5)
Z¯ − Z(t) ≥ 0. (6)
When the atmospheric carbon stock reaches its critical level, i.e. when Z(t) = Z¯, and
absent any active capture policy, i.e. sa(t) = se(t) = 0, then the total oil consumption
x(t) ≡ x1(t)+x2(t) is constrained to be at most equal to x¯, where x¯ is solution of ζx−αZ¯ =
0, that is:
x¯ =
α
ζ
Z¯.
We assume that it may be optimal to abate the pollution for delaying the date of arrival
at the critical threshold and for relaxing the constraint on the oil consumption flow, that
is:
cx + ca < u′(x¯)⇒ cx + ce < u′(x¯).
The alternative energy source is supplied by the carbon-free renewable resource, the
solar energy. We denote by yi(t) the solar energy consumption in sector i, i = 1, 2, and by
cy the average delivery cost of this alternative energy. Because cx and cy both include all
the costs necessary to deliver a ready for use energy unit to the potential users, then both
resources may be seen as perfect substitutes for the consumers, so that we may define the
aggregate energy consumption of sector i as qi = xi + yi, i = 1, 2, as far as the costs cx
and cy are incurred.
The average cost cy is assumed to be constant, the same for both sectors, and higher
than u′(x¯/2). This last condition implies that the optimal energy consumption paths can
be split into two periods: a first one during which only oil is consumed and a second one
during which only solar energy is used. We also have to assume that the natural flow of
available solar energy, denoted by yn, is large enough to supply the energy needs in both
sectors during the second period described above. Let y˜ be the sectoral energy consumption
that it would be optimal to consume at the marginal cost cy, that is y˜ = qd(cy) for which
u′(y˜) = cy. Then we assume that yn > 2y˜. Under this assumption, no rent has ever to be
imputed for using the solar energy. Thus the only constraint on yi(t) having to be taken
into account along any optimal path is a non-negativity constraint:
yi(t) ≥ 0, i = 1, 2. (7)
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Finally, the instantaneous social rate of discount, denoted by ρ, ρ > 0, is assumed to
be constant over time.
3 Social planner problem and optimality conditions
The problem of the social planner consists in maximizing the sum of the discounted net
current surplus. Let (P ) be this program:
(P ) max
sa,se,xi,yi,i=1,2
∫ ∞
0
{u [x1(t) + y1(t)] + u [x2(t) + y2(t)]− cx [x1(t) + x2(t)]
−cy [y1(t) + y2(t)]− casa(t)− cese(t)} e−ρtdt
subject to (1)-(7).
Let us denote by λX the costate variable of the state variable X, by λZ minus the
costate variable of the state variable Z, by γ's the Lagrange multipliers associated with
the non-negativity constraints on the command variables, and by ν the Lagrange multiplier
associated with the ceiling constraint on Z. As usually done in this kind of problem, we do
not take explicitly into account the non-negativity constraint on X. Thus we may write
the current value Lagrangian L of problem (P ) as follows:
L(t) = u [x1(t) + y1(t)] + u [x2(t) + y2(t)]− cx [x1(t) + x2(t)]− cy [y1(t) + y2(t)]
−casa(t)− cese(t)− λX(t) [x1(t) + x2(t)]
−λZ(t) {ζ [x1(t) + x2(t)]− [sa(t) + se(t)]− αZ(t)}
+ν(t)
[
Z¯ − Z(t)]+∑
i
γxi(t)xi(t) +
∑
i
γyi(t)yi(t)
+γsa(t)sa(t) + γse(t)se(t) + γ¯se(t) [ζx1(t)− se(t)]
The first-order conditions relative to the command variables are:
∂L
∂x1
= 0 ⇒ u′[x1(t) + y1(t)] = cx + λX(t) + ζ[λZ(t)− γ¯se(t)]− γx1(t) (8)
∂L
∂x2
= 0 ⇒ u′[x2(t) + y2(t)] = cx + λX(t) + ζλZ(t)− γx2(t) (9)
∂L
∂yi
= 0 ⇒ u′[xi(t) + yi(t)] = cy − γyi(t), i = 1, 2 (10)
∂L
∂sa
= 0 ⇒ ca = λZ(t) + γsa(t) (11)
∂L
∂se
= 0 ⇒ ce = λZ(t)− γ¯se(t) + γse(t) (12)
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The associated complementary slackness conditions are:
γxi(t) ≥ 0, xi(t) ≥ 0 and γxi(t)xi(t) = 0, i = 1, 2 (13)
γyi(t) ≥ 0, yi(t) ≥ 0 and γyi(t)yi(t) = 0, i = 1, 2 (14)
γsa(t) ≥ 0, sa(t) ≥ 0 and γsa(t)sa(t) = 0 (15)
γse(t) ≥ 0, se(t) ≥ 0 and γse(t)se(t) = 0 (16)
γ¯se(t) ≥ 0, ζx1(t)− se(t) ≥ 0 and γ¯se(t)[ζx1(t)− se(t)] = 0 (17)
The dynamics of the costate variables must satisfy:
λ˙X = ρλX − ∂L
X
⇒ λ˙X(t) = ρλX(t) (18)
λ˙Z = ρλZ − ∂L
Z
⇒ λ˙Z(t) = (ρ+ α)λZ(t)− ν(t) (19)
together with the complementary slackness condition:
ν(t) ≥ 0, Z¯ − Z(t) ≥ 0 and ν(t)[Z¯ − Z(t)] ≥ 0. (20)
Last, the transversality conditions take the following forms:
lim
t↑∞
e−ρtλX(t)X(t) = 0 (21)
lim
t↑∞
e−ρtλZ(t)Z(t) = 0 (22)
Remarks:
1. The shadow marginal value of the stock of oil, or mining rent, λX(t), must grow at
the social rate of discount ρ. From (18), we get:
λX(t) = λX0e
ρt, λX0 ≡ λX(0). (23)
Thus the transversality condition (21) reduces to:
λX0 lim
t↑∞
X(t) = 0. (24)
If oil is to have some value, λX0 > 0, then it must be exhausted along the optimal
path.
2. Concerning the shadow marginal cost of the atmospheric carbon stock, λZ(t), note
that before the date tZ at which the ceiling constraint is beginning to be active, we
must have ν(t) = 0 since Z¯ − Z(t) > 0. Then (19) reduces to λ˙Z = (ρ + α)λZ so
that:
t < tZ ⇒ λZ(t) = λZ0e(ρ+α)t, λZ0 ≡ λZ(0). (25)
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Once the ceiling constraint is no more active and forever, λZ(t) = 0. Thus, denoting
by t¯Z the latest date at which Z(t) = Z¯, we get:
t > t¯Z ⇒ λZ(t) = 0. (26)
In order to simplify the notations in the next sections, it is useful to define the following
prices or full marginal costs and the corresponding sectoral consumption levels for which
the F.O.C's (8) and (9) relative to x1(t) and to x2(t), respectively, are satisfied5.
• Price or full marginal cost of oil and sectoral oil consumption before the ceiling and
absent any abatement, whatever the sector under consideration:
p1(t, λX0 , λZ0) ≡ cx + λX0eρt + ζλZ0e(ρ+α)t (27)
q˜1(t, λX0 , λZ0) ≡ qd
(
p1(t, λX0 , λZ0)
)
(28)
• Price or full marginal cost of oil for consumption in sector 1 given that emissions
from this sector are fully or partially abated, i.e. se(t) > 0, and corresponding oil
consumption of sector 1:
p2e(t, λX0) ≡ cx + λX0eρt + ζce (29)
q˜2e(t, λX0) ≡ qd
(
p2e(t, λX0)
)
(30)
• Price or full marginal cost of oil for consumption in sector 2 given that some part of
the atmospheric carbon stock is captured, sa(t) > 0, and corresponding consumption
in this sector:
p2a(t, λX0) ≡ cx + λX0eρt + ζca (31)
q˜2a(t, λX0) ≡ qd
(
p2a(t, λX0)
)
(32)
• Price or full marginal cost of oil once the ceiling constraint Z¯ − Z(t) ≥ 0 is no more
active and forever, and corresponding sectoral consumptions, whatever the sector:
p3(t, λX0) ≡ cx + λX0eρt (33)
q˜3(t, λX0) ≡ qd
(
p3(t, λX0)
)
(34)
This last case corresponds to a pure Hotelling regime.
5The upper indexes n = 1, 2, 3 correspond to the order in which the price pn and the quantity q˜n are
appearing along the optimal path. If both pn(t, ...) and pn+m(t′, ...) are appearing along the same path,
then it implies that t < t′.
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Problem solving strategy:
To solve the social planner problem (P ), we proceed as follows. First, we check whether
the most costly device to capture the carbon has ever to be used. The test consists in
solving the social planner problem assuming that the atmospheric carbon capture device is
not available. This is inducing some path of atmospheric carbon shadow cost λZ(t). Then:
- either this shadow cost is permanently lower than the marginal cost of atmospheric
carbon capture, that is λZ(t) < ca for any t ≥ 0, and then the atmospheric carbon capture
device has never to be used because too costly;
- or there exists some time interval during which λZ(t) is higher than ca so that, in
this case, the atmospheric carbon capture device must be activated since the loss in the
marginal net surplus induced by not using it is higher than its marginal cost of use.
4 Optimal policy without atmospheric carbon capture device
This kind of policies have been investigated and characterized in Chakravorty et al. (2006-
a, 2006-b) and in Lafforgue et al. (2008-a, 2008-b), but for economies in which any potential
emissions can be captured and sequestered irrespective of the oil consumption sector. Thus,
in their models, there is a single consumption sector, similar to the sector 1 of the present
model.
Two important conclusions of these studies are that: i) it is never optimal to abate
the potential flow of emissions before attaining the critical level Z¯ of atmospheric carbon
concentration; ii) along the phase at the ceiling during which it is optimal to abate, only
some part of the potential emission flow must be abated; because abating is never optimal
excepted during this phase, then it is never optimal to fully abate the potential flow of
emissions along the optimal path.
As we shall show, it may happen in the present context that: i) abating the potential
emissions of the sector 1 has to begin before the ceiling level Z¯ is attained; ii) when it is
optimal to begin to capture the sector 1 potential emissions, before the ceiling is attained,
then it is optimal to capture its whole potential emission flow.
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4.1 Restricted social planner problem
Assuming that the atmospheric carbon capture technology is not available, the social
planner problem reduces to the following restricted problem (R.P ):
(R.P ) max
se,xi,yi,i=1,2
∫ ∞
0
{u [x1(t) + y1(t)] + u [x2(t) + y2(t)]− cx [x1(t) + x2(t)]
−cy [y1(t) + y2(t)]− cese(t)} e−ρtdt
subject to (1), (2), (3), (6), (7) and:
Z˙(t) = ζ[x1(t) + x2(t)]− se(t)− αZ(t), Z(0) = Z0 < Z¯ (35)
The current value Lagrangian of (R.P ), denoted by LR, writes now:
LR(t) = u [x1(t) + y1(t)] + u [x2(t) + y2(t)]− cx [x1(t) + x2(t)]− cy [y1(t) + y2(t)]
−cese(t)− λX(t) [x1(t) + x2(t)]− λZ(t) {ζ [x1(t) + x2(t)]− se(t)− αZ(t)}
+ν(t)
[
Z¯ − Z(t)]+∑
i
γxi(t)xi(t) +
∑
i
γyi(t)yi(t)
+γse(t)se(t) + γ¯se(t) [ζx1(t)− se(t)] .
The new F.O.C's relative to the command variables, except sa, together with the asso-
ciated complementary slackness conditions, are the same then the ones of the unrestricted
problem (P ), namely (8)-(12) and (13)-(17). Also the equations (18) and(19) determining
the dynamics of the costate variables, the complementary slackness condition (20) on ν
and the associated transversality conditions (21) and (22) when t tends to infinity, must
hold.
We can conclude that remarks 1 and 2 of the previous section 3 also hold in the present
restricted context.
4.2 Optimal paths along which it is optimal to capture and sequester
before being at the ceiling
Let us assume that the initial oil endowment is large enough to justify some period at
the ceiling during which Z(t) = Z¯, and that there exists some period during which the
emissions of sector 1 are wholly or partially abated, se(t) > 0. Two kinds of such paths
can be optimal, depending on whether sector 1's emissions have to be captured from the
beginning of the planning horizon or later.
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4.2.1 Optimal paths along which it is not optimal to abate from the beginning
Such paths are illustrated in the Figure 1 below.
[Figure 1 here]
The optimal price path depicted in Figure 1 is a seven phases path. Denoting by pi(t),
for i = 1, 2, the price  or full marginal cost  of oil for sector i, these phases are the
following:
- Phase 1, before the ceiling and without abatement: [0, te)
During this phase, the oil price is the same for each sector and it is given by p1(t) = p2(t) =
p1(t, λX0 , λZ0). The existence of such a phase requires that λZ0 < ce, so p
1(t, λX0 , λZ0) <
p2e(t, λX0), that is capturing sector 1's emissions would be too costly. p
1(t, λX0 , λZ0) −
p2e(t, λX0) = ζ
[
λZ0e
(ρ+α)t − ce
]
< 0, is increasing so that supporting the marginal shadow
cost of the atmospheric carbon stock, λZ(t) = λZ0e
(ρ+α)t, is less costly than abating, that
is supporting the marginal cost of abating the sector 1's emissions, ce.
The oil consumption of each sector is given by x1(t) = x2(t) = q˜1(t, λX0 , λZ0).
The common oil price p1(t, λX0 , λZ0) is increasing at an instantaneous rate which is
higher than the rate of growth of p2e(t, λX0). At the end of the phase, denoted by te, both
prices are equated p1(t, λX0 , λZ0) = p
2
e(t, λX0).
Note that, since p1(t) = p2(t) < u′(x¯) and Z0 < Z¯, then during this phase both x1(t)
and x2(t) are higher than x¯ so that Z(t) is increasing. However, the existence of this phase
requires that, at its end, Z(t) is lower than the critical level Z¯: Z(te) < Z¯.
- Phase 2, before the ceiling with full abatement of sector 1's emissions: [te, tZ)
From te onwards, we have p
2
e(t, λX0) < p
1(t, λX0 , λZ0). Thus it is now strictly less costly
for sector 1 to abate than not to abate, hence p1(t) = p2e(t, λX0), implying that x1(t) =
q˜2e(t, λX0).
6 Moreover, since the inequality is strict then the potential sector 1's emissions
are fully abated: se(t) = ζx1(t).
6Note that during such a phase, because se(t) > 0 then γse(t) = 0, so that from (12) we obtain:
λZ(t) = ce + γ¯se(t).
Substituting for λZ(t) in (8) and taking into account that x1(t) > 0, hence γx1(t) = 0, and y1(t) = 0, we
get:
u′ (x1(t)) = cx + λX0e
ρt + ζce,
from which we conclude that p1(t) = p
2
e(t, λX0) and x1(t) = q˜
2
e(t, λX0).
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Sector 2 is not able to abate its emissions and it must support the carbon shadow
cost ζλZ0e
(ρ+α)t per unit of burned oil, so that p2(t) = p1(t, λX0 , λZ0) and x2(t) =
q˜1(t, λX0 , λZ0).
Note that, during this phase, since Z(te) < Z¯ and p2(t) < u′(x¯), then x2(t) > x¯ and
the atmospheric carbon stock increases. Finally, since p2(t) > p1(t), the first of these two
prices reaching u′(x¯) is p2(t). However, in order that sector 2's consumption begins to be
blockaded at t = tZ , we must have simultaneously p2(t) = u′(x¯) and Z(t) = Z¯ at the end
of the phase.
- Phase 3, at the ceiling with sector 2's oil consumption blockaded and sector
1's emissions fully abated: [tZ , t˜)
During this phase, the oil price in sector 2 is given by p2(t) = u′(x¯) and the oil consumption
of this sector is set to the maximum consumption level allowed by the ceiling constraint,
i.e. x2(t) = x¯. Note that this implies that λZ(t) = [u′(x¯)− p3(t, λX0)]/ζ is decreasing over
time during the phase7.
Since p2e(tZ , λX0) < u
′(x¯), then ce < λZ(t) at the beginning of the phase. Then,
once again, abating emissions is proved to be less costly for sector 1 than supporting the
shadow cost of the atmospheric carbon stock. Consequently, the sector 1's emissions are
fully captured: se(t) = ζx1(t). Since p1(t) = p2e(tZ , λX0), we still have x1(t) = q˜
2
e(t, λX0).
Given that sector 2's emissions are ζx2(t) = ζx¯, full abatement in sector 1 implies that,
during this phase at the ceiling, the atmospheric carbon stock stays at its critical level:
Z˙(t) = 0 and Z(t) = Z¯. Finally, p1(t) = p2e(t, λX0) is increasing during the phase. At the
end of the phase, p2e(t, λX0) = u
′(x¯) or, equivalently, λZ(t) = ca.
- Phase 4, at the ceiling with partial abatement of sector 1's emissions: [t˜, t¯e)
From time t˜ onwards, p2e(t, λX0) becomes higher than u
′(x¯). Thus, the only way to satisfy
simultaneously the F.O.C's (8) and (9) on the xi's is to set p1(t) = p2(t) = p2e(t, λX0),
which implies x1(t) = x2(t) = q˜2e(t, λX0) together with a partial abatement of sector 1's
emissions. As far as p2e(t, λX0) is staying under u
′(x¯/2), then the potential emissions
amount to 2ζq˜2e(t, λX0) > ζx¯ = αZ¯. As far as p
2
e(t, λX0) is now higher than u
′(x¯), then the
7Since the ceiling constraint is active, then ν(t) is strictly positive and sufficiently high so that λ˙Z(t) =
(ρ+ α)λZ(t)− ν(t) < 0.
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potential emissions 2ζq˜2e(t, λX0) stays at a lower level than 2ζx¯, so that:
x¯ < 2q˜2e(t, λX0) < 2x¯. (36)
In order to satisfy the atmospheric carbon constraint Z(t) = Z¯, it is sufficient to abate
this part se(t) of the sector 1's emissions for which Z˙(t) = 0. Thus we may have:
2ζq˜2e(t, λX0)− se(t) = ζx¯. (37)
Conditions (36) and (37) imply that:
se(t) = ζ
[
2q˜2e(t, λX0)− x¯
]
< ζq˜2e(t, λX0) = ζx1(t). (38)
Hence, during this phase, emissions from sector 1 are only partially abated and, since
q˜2e(t, λX0) is decreasing through time then the instantaneous rate of capture se(t) is also
decreasing. This solution may be optimal if and only if abating and supporting the shadow
marginal cost of the atmospheric carbon stock are resulting into the same full marginal
cost, that is if and only if λZ(t) is constant and equal to ce. Since sector 2 cannot abate
its emissions, it is supporting the marginal shadow cost of atmospheric carbon and the
condition p1(t) = p2(t) = p2e(t, λX0) = cx + λX0e
ρt + ζλZ(t) guarantees that λZ(t) = ce is
satisfied8.
Since p2e(t, λX0) is increasing over time, there exists some date t¯e at which p
2
e(t, λX0) =
u′(x¯/2). At this date, x1(t) = x2(t) = x¯/2 and sector 1 ceases to capture its emissions,
se(t) = 0. From t¯e onwards, we have p2e(t, λX0) > u
′(x¯/2) so that the cost of capture of
sector 1's emissions becomes prohibitive.
- Phase 5, at the ceiling and without abatement of sector 1's emissions: [t¯e, t¯Z)
Since abating the sector 1's emissions is now too costly, there is no more abatement and, in
order to not overshoot the critical atmospheric carbon level, we must have p1(t) = p2(t) =
u′(x¯/2) and x1(t) = x2(t) = x¯/2, so that Z˙(t) = 0.
During such a phase, λZ(t) = u′(x¯) − p3(t, λX0)/ζ is decreasing. The phase is ending
at time t = t¯Z when λZ(t) = 0, which implies that p3(t, λX0) > u
′(x¯/2) for t > t¯Z .
8Again, because the ceiling constraint is effective then ν(t) > 0 and, in order that λ˙Z(t) = 0, we have:
ν(t) = (ρ+ α)λZ(t) = (ρ+ α)ce.
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- Phase 6, pure Hotelling phase: [t¯Z , ty)
This phase is the last one during which energy needs are supplied by oil. This is a pure
Hotelling phase. The energy price is the same for the two sectors: p1(t) = p2(t) =
p3(t, λX0) > u
′(x¯/2), also generating an identical oil consumption in the two sectors:
x1(t) = x2(t) < x¯/2⇒ x(t) < x¯.
Since x(t) < x¯ and Z(t) = Z¯ at the beginning of the phase, then Z(t) < Z¯ for t > t¯Z
justifying the fact that now λZ(t) = 0 from t¯Z onwards9. Then λZ(t)Z(t) = 0 and the
transversality condition (22) is satisfied.
During the phase, the price is ever increasing and there must exist some time t = ty
at which p3(t, λX0) = cy. At this time, this level of oil price makes the renewable resource
competitive. To be optimal, the switch from the pure Hotelling regime to a pure renewable
regime requires that, at time t = ty, X(t) = 0 so that from ty onwards λX(t)X(t) = 0
warranting that the transversality condition (21) relative to X is satisfied.
- Phase 7, carbon-free renewable energy permanent regime: [ty,+∞)
From ty onwards, the economy follows a pure renewable energy regime which is free of
carbon emissions: p1(t) = p2(t) = cy, x1(t) = x2(t) = 0 and y1(t) = y2(t) = y˜. Since
xi(t) = 0, i = 1, 2, then Z˙(t) = −αZ(t) so that Z(t) is permanently decreasing down to 0
at infinity: Z(t) = Z(ty)e−α(t−ty).
Determination of the characteristics of the optimal path:
The optimal path described above is parametrized by eight variables whose values have to
be determined: λX0 , λZ0 , te, tZ , t˜, t¯e, t¯Z and ty. They are given as the solutions of the
following eight equations system.
- Balance equation of non-renewable resource consumption and supply:
2
∫ te
0
q˜1(t, λX0 , λZ0)dt+
∫ tZ
te
[
q˜1(t, λX0 , λZ0) + q˜
2
e(t, λX0)
]
dt
+
∫ t˜
tZ
[
q˜2e(t, λX0) + x¯
]
dt+ 2
∫ t¯e
t˜
q˜2e(t, λX0)dt
+ [t¯Z − t¯e] x¯+ 2
∫ ty
t¯Z
q˜3(t, λX0)dt = X
0. (39)
9However, note that Z(t) is not necessarily monotonically decreasing during this phase. What is sure
is that there exists some critical time interval (t¯Z , t¯Z + ), with  positive and small enough, during which
Z˙(t) < 0. For t > t¯Z +, it may happen that Z˙(t) > 0. But, because x(t) < x¯, even if Z˙(t) were temporally
increasing, it would not be able to go back to Z¯.
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- Continuity of the carbon stock at time tZ :
Z0e−αtZ + 2ζ
∫ te
0
q˜1(t, λX0 , λZ0)e
−α(tZ−t)dt
+ζ
∫ tZ
te
q˜1(t, λX0 , λZ0)e
−α(tZ−t)dt = Z¯. (40)
- Price continuity equations:
p1 (te, λX0 , λZ0) = p
2
e (te, λX0) (41)
p1 (tZ , λX0 , λZ0) = u
′(x¯) (42)
p2e
(
t˜, λX0
)
= u′(x¯) (43)
p2e (t¯e, λX0) = u
′(x¯/2) (44)
p3 (t¯Z , λX0) = u
′(x¯/2) (45)
p3(ty, λX0) = cy. (46)
Assuming a positive solution of system (39)-(46), then it is easy to check that all the
optimality conditions of the restricted problem (R.P ) are satisfied. Reciprocally, it is clear
that there exists values of the parameters of the system cx, cy, ce, ζ, α and ρ together
with values of initial endowments of oil X0 and of atmospheric carbon stock Z0 such that
the path described above is the solution of the restricted problem (R.P ). However, other
solutions may exist.
4.2.2 Optimal paths along which it is optimal to abate from the beginning
Consider the optimal path characterized in the previous subsection 4.2.1 and some date tˆ
between te and tZ (see Figure 1). At this time tˆ:
- The stock of oil amounts to:
X(tˆ) = X0 − 2
∫ te
0
q˜1(t, λX0 , λZ0)dt−
∫ tˆ
te
q˜1(t, λX0 , λZ0)dt
−
∫ tˆ
te
q˜2e(t, λX0)dt. (47)
- The stock of atmospheric carbon is:
Z(tˆ) = Z0e−αtˆ + 2ζ
∫ te
0
q˜1(t, λX0 , λZ0)e
−α(tˆ−t)dt
+ζ
∫ tˆ
te
q˜1(t, λX0 , λZ0)e
−α(tˆ−t)dt+ ζ
∫ tˆ
te
q˜2e(t, λX0)e
−α(tˆ−t)dt (48)
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Assume that the oil endowment of the economy is X(tˆ) instead of X0 and that the
initial atmospheric carbon stock is Z(tˆ) < Z¯ instead of Z0. Since in the present model
the solution of (R.P ) is time consistent, then the optimal price path restricted by this
new initial conditions (47) and (48) proves to be this part of the previous path beginning
at time t = tˆ. More precisely, if pi(t), i = 1, 2, is the solution described in the previous
subsection 4.2.1, then the solution, denoted by pˆi(t), corresponding to the initial conditions
(47) and (48) is given by:
pˆi(t) = pi(t+ tˆ), i = 1, 2. (49)
Now, the first phase (i.e. phase 1) before the ceiling and without emission abatement
is going out and sector 1's emissions must be captured from the beginning of the planning
horizon, that is from tˆ.
4.3 Paths along which the oil prices path is the same for the two sectors
4.3.1 Paths along which it is optimal to abate sector 1's emissions
Example of such a path, solution of the restricted problem (R.P ), is illustrated in Figure
2 below.
[Figure 2 here.]
This kind of paths is characterized by the fact that, at time t = te at which p1(t, λX0 , λZ0) =
p2e(t, λX0), then the common value of these two prices is larger than u
′(x¯) while Z(te) = Z¯
simultaneously.
Because Z0 < Z¯ there must exist a first phase [0, te) during which the ceiling Z¯ is not
yet attained and p1(t) = p2(t) = p1(t, λX0 , λZ0) < p
2
e(t, λX0), hence it is not optimal to
abate sector 1's emissions. At the end of this first phase, both p1(t, λX0 , λZ0) = p
2
e(t, λX0)
and Z(te) = Z¯ so that te coincides with tZ .
The next phase [te, t¯e) is a phase at the ceiling during which p1(t) = p2(t) = p2e(t, λX0).
As in the phase 4 of the previous case  [t˜, t¯e) of the path illustrated in Figure 1  because
sector 2 cannot abate its emissions, we must have λZ(t) = ce during the second phase
of the present path. Also because u′(x¯) < p2e(t, λX0) < u′(x¯/2), then only some part
of the sector 1's emissions have to be captured (cf. the above equation (38)), se(t) <
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ζq˜2e(t, λX0) = ζx1(t), and the capture intensity se(t) diminishes. At the end of this phase,
p2e(t, λX0) = u
′(x¯/2), x1(t) = x2(t) = x¯/2 and se(t) = 0.
The third phase [t¯e, t¯Z) is still a phase at the ceiling but without capture of sector 1's
emissions: p1(t) = p2(t) = u′(x¯/2) and x1(t) = x2(t) = x¯/2. The phase is ending when
p3(t, λX0) = u
′(x¯/2), that is when λZ(t) = 0. The fourth and fifth phases are respectively
the standard pure Hotelling phase [t¯Z , ty) and the pure renewable energy phase [ty,∞).
4.3.2 Paths along which it is never optimal to capture sector 1's emissions
When the abatement cost ce is very high, capturing is proved to never be an optimal
strategy. In this case, we get a four phases optimal price path as illustrated in Figure 3.
[Figure 3 here.]
In Figure 3, p2e(t, λX0) is higher than p
1(t, λX0 , λZ0) along the whole time interval [0, tZ)
before the ceiling. Hence, it is never optimal to capture sector 1's emissions. Such optimal
paths have been characterized in Chakravorty et al. (2006-a, 2006-b).
5 Optimal policies requiring to activate both capture devices
In this section, we first determine the conditions under which it is optimal to activate the
atmospheric carbon capture device. Next we characterize the optimal paths along which
both carbon capture technologies must be used. Last, we discuss about the time profile of
the optimal carbon marginal shadow cost, that is the optimal unitary carbon tax, as well
as the total burden induced by climate change mitigation policies in each sector, including
the tax burden and the abatement cost.
5.1 Checking whether the atmospheric carbon capture is optimal
Let us consider the four kinds of optimal price paths which may solve the planner restricted
problem (R.P ) and which have been discussed in the previous section. Clearly, since
p2a(t, λX0) > p
2
e(t, λX0), then for the two last kinds of optimal paths illustrated in Figures
2 and 3 in the subsections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 respectively, the price trajectory p2a(t, λX0) (not
depicted in these figures) is always located above the optimal price path. Hence, it is never
optimal to use the atmospheric carbon capture device.
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For the two first kinds of optimal paths illustrated in Figure 1, with a starting point at
time t = 0 as studied in the subsection 4.2.1, or at time tˆ as characterized in the subsection
4.2.2, then it may happen that using the atmospheric carbon capture technology reveals
optimal. To check whether this technology is optimal or not, the test runs as follows.
Consider the price path p2a(t, λX0) (not depicted in Figure 1). Then at time t = tZ , either
p2a(t, λX0) < u
′(x¯) or p2a(t, λX0) ≥ u′(x¯). In the first case, there must exist a time interval
around t = tZ such that p2(t) > p2a(t, λX0) and it would be less costly for sector 2 to
bear the cost of the atmospheric capture ca than the burden of the shadow cost of the
atmospheric carbon stock λZ(t). In the second case, using the atmospheric carbon capture
technology could not allow to improve the welfare.
5.2 Optimal paths
Let us assume now that the atmospheric carbon capture technology has to be used. Then
we may obtain two kinds of optimal paths depending on whether the least costly emission
capture technology has to be activated from the beginning or not. The typical optimal
path along which it is not optimal to capture the sector 1's emission flows from the start
is illustrated in Figure 4 below.
[Figure 4 here.]
The path is an eight phases path and the difference with the trajectory depicted in
Figure 1 is that a new phase [ta, t¯a)  the third one in the present case  appears now
during which some of the atmospheric carbon is captured. The seven other phases are
similar to the ones which have been described in section 4.2.1. This new phase begins at
t = ta when p1(t, λX0 , λZ0) = p
2
a(t, λX0), that is when λZ(t) = ca. Then for t > ta, it
becomes less costly for sector 2 to undertake atmospheric carbon capture rather than to
pay the social cost of the carbon accumulation within the atmosphere. At the time sector
2's abatement begins, the ceiling is reached, so that ta coincides with tZ .
During this phase [ta, t¯a), each sector uses simultaneously its own abatement technology.
We have p1(t) = p2e(t, λX0) and p2(t) = p
2
a(t, λX0), which implies x1(t) = q˜
2
e(t, λX0) and
x2(t) = q˜2a(t, λX0). Since ce < ca, we also have p1(t) < p2(t) and then x1(t) > x2(t).
Remember that, during this phase, as in the phase 3 of subsection 4.2.1, sector 1's emissions
are fully captured: se(t) = ζx1(t). Because this is a phase at the ceiling, sector 2 has just
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to capture in the atmosphere the necessary amount of carbon in order to maintain the
atmospheric carbon stock at its critical level. It is thus optimal for sector 2 to abate at
a level which is smaller than its own carbon emissions: sa(t) = ζx2(t) − αZ¯ < ζx2(t).
Moreover, since sa(t) > 0, we have ζx2(t) > αZ¯, or equivalently, x2(t) > x¯, implying in
turns p2(t) < u′(x¯). The price path p2(t) = p2a(t, λX0) being increasing through time, first
the amount of abated carbon by the atmospheric device sa(t) is decreasing, second there
must exist a date at which p2(t) = u′(x¯), that is at which x2(t) = x¯ and sa(t) = 0. At
that time, denoted by t¯a, since sector 1 still fully abates all its emissions, it is no more
optimal for sector 2 to pursue the atmospheric carbon capture. All the efforts to maintain
the carbon stabilization cap are now supported by the sole sector 1 and the economy
identically behaves as in section 4.2.1 from phase 3, that if from the date tZ as depicted
in Figure 1.
To the eight variables parameterizing the optimal path in the case without atmospheric
capture technology (cf. subsection 4.2.1), we must here identify two additional variables:
ta (equal to tZ) and t¯a. We thus obtain nine variables that must solve the following nine
equations system:
- Balance equation of non-renewable resource consumption and supply:
2
∫ te
0
q˜1(t, λX0 , λZ0)dt+
∫ ta=tZ
te
[
q˜1(t, λX0 , λZ0) + q˜
2
e(t, λX0)
]
dt
+
∫ t¯a
ta=tZ
[
q˜2e(t, λX0) + q˜
2
a(t, λX0)
]
dt+
∫ t˜
t¯a
[
q˜2e(t, λX0) + x¯
]
dt
+2
∫ t¯e
t˜
q˜2e(t, λX0)dt+ [t¯Z − t¯e] x¯+ 2
∫ ty
t¯Z
q˜3(t, λX0)dt = X
0. (50)
- Continuity of the carbon stock at time tZ : identical to (40).
- Price continuity equations: identical to (41)-(46) except that (42) is now replaced by
the two following equations:
p1 (ta, λX0 , λZ0) = p
2
a(ta, λX0) (51)
p2a (t¯a, λX0) = u
′(x¯) (52)
5.3 Time profile of the optimal carbon tax
The trajectory of the carbon marginal shadow cost corresponding to the optimal path
illustrated in Figure 4 is characterized by:
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λZ(t) =

λZ0e
(ρ+α)t , t ∈ [0, tZ)
ca , t ∈ [tZ , t¯a)[
u′(x¯)− p3(t, λX0)
]
/ζ , t ∈ [t¯a, t˜)
ce , t ∈ [t˜, t¯e)[
u′(x¯/2)− p3(t, λX0)
]
/ζ , t ∈ [t¯e, t¯Z)
0 , t ∈ [t¯Z ,∞)
(53)
This shadow cost can be interpreted as the optimal unitary tax to be levied on the net
carbon emissions. Its time profile is illustrated in Figure 5 below.
[Figure 5 here.]
The unitary tax rate is first increasing but is bounded from above by the highest
marginal abatement cost ca which is attained when it becomes optimal to use this abate-
ment device and, simultaneously, when the atmospheric carbon stock constraint begins to
be active, that is at time t = ta = tZ . Given that it is always possible to choose to abate
rather than release the carbon in the atmosphere, the maximal tax rate of carbon emis-
sions is necessarily determined by the highest marginal cost permitting to avoid polluting
carbon releases.
During the ceiling phases, from tZ up to t¯Z , the carbon tax is either constant or
decreasing. First, as long as sector 2 abates, that is between ta and t¯a, it is sufficient to set
the tax rate equal to ca to induce an optimal atmospheric capture by sector 2, given that
sector 1 fully abates its own emissions. The same applies between t˜ and t¯e for sector 1 by
setting the tax rate equal to ce, given that sector 2 no more abates. Between these two
phases, that is between t¯a and t˜, and during the last phase at the ceiling, that is between
t¯e and t¯Z , the tax rate strictly decreases. This is due to the oil price increase and to the
fact that the emission level is constrained by x¯ for sector 2 during [t¯a, t˜), and by x¯/2 for
each sector during [t¯e, t¯Z).
5.4 Time profile of the tax burden and of the sequestration cost
Assume now that the tax rate described above is implemented. The instantaneous induced
fiscal income from each sector is defined by Γ1(t) ≡ [ζx1(t) − se(t)]λZ(t) for sector 1 and
by Γ2(t) ≡ [ζx2(t)− sa(t)]λZ(t) for sector 2. The sequestration cost in each sector simply
writes as the sequestered carbon flow times the respective marginal cost of sequestration:
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S1(t) ≡ se(t)ce and S2(t) ≡ sa(t)ca. Then, the total burden of carbon mitigation efforts
for each sector is the sum of the fiscal burden and the sequestration cost. Denoting by
Bi(t) i = 1, 2 such a total burden, the two following tables details its components for each
sector.
Γ1(t) S1(t) B1(t) Phases
ζq˜1(t)λZ0e
(ρ+α)t 0 ζq˜1(t)λZ0e
(ρ+α)t [0, te)
0 ζq˜2e(t)ce ζq˜
2
e(t)ce [te, t˜)
ζ
[
x¯− q˜2e(t)
]
ce ζ
[
2q˜2e(t)− x¯
]
ce ζq˜
2
e(t)ce [t˜, t¯e)
(x¯/2)
[
u′(x¯/2)− p3(t)] 0 (x¯/2) [u′(x¯/2)− p3(t)] [t¯e, t¯Z)
0 0 0 [t¯Z ,∞)
Table 1. Decomposition of the total carbon reduction burden in sector 1.
Γ2(t) S2(t) B2(t) Phases
ζq˜1(t)λZ0e
(ρ+α)t 0 ζq˜1(t)λZ0e
(ρ+α)t [0, ta)
ζx¯ca ζ[q˜2a(t)− x¯]ca ζq˜2a(t)ca [ta, t¯a)
x¯
[
u′(x¯)− p3(t)] 0 x¯ [u′(x¯)− p3(t)] [t¯a, t˜)
ζq˜2e(t)ce 0 ζq˜
2
e(t)ce [t˜, t¯e)
(x¯/2)
[
u′(x¯/2)− p3(t)] 0 (x¯/2) [u′(x¯/2)− p3(t)] [t¯e, t¯Z)
0 0 0 [t¯Z ,∞)
Table 2. Decomposition of the total carbon reduction burden in sector 2.
Their time profile are depicted by Figure 6 below.
[Figure 6 here.]
Before the ceiling phases, the shapes of the total burden trajectories may be either
increasing or decreasing depending upon oil demand elasticity. Once the ceiling is reached,
the total burden gradually declines down to zero at the end of the ceiling phase.
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For sector 1, the total burden identifies to the sole tax burden as long as abatement
is not activated, that is before te. Between te and t˜, sector 1, fully abating its emissions,
does not bear the carbon tax burden (Γ1(t) = 0), but it bears the sequestration cost S1(t).
During this phase, since sector 1's emissions decrease, so does its sequestration cost and
thus its total burden. During the next phase, between t˜ and t¯e, it is no more optimal
for sector 1 to fully abate its emissions and then, this sector bears a mix of tax burden
and abatement cost. Even if its gross carbon emissions diminish, its sequestration flow
decreases at a higher rate resulting in an increase in the net emission flow. The cost of
sequestration thus decreases. Since the tax rate is constant and equal to ce, the fiscal
burden rises. The combined effect of these two evolutions results in a decline of the total
carbon burden of sector 1. Over the last ceiling phase, between t¯e and t¯Z , sector 1 no more
abates and bears only the fiscal burden. Then its total burden is declining and it reaches
zero when the ceiling constraint becomes no more active, that is at time t¯Z .
Sector 2 bears simultaneously the tax and the sequestration cost burden only during the
atmospheric capture phase, that is between ta and t¯a. During this phase, its fiscal burden
is constant because i) the tax rate is constant and equal to ca and ii) sector 1 fully abates
its emissions and sector 2's net emissions are constrained by x¯. Its sequestration effort
decreases since gross emissions decline. After t¯a and during all next phases at the ceiling,
the total burden of sector 2 reduces to the sole fiscal burden and it is thus decreasing over
time as discussed above.
We conclude by two remarks. First, the total fiscal income, that is Γ1(t) + Γ2(t),
jumps down twice at each time where either sector 1 or sector 2 begins to abate. Then,
any redistributive environmental policy should take into account the ability of polluters to
undertake abatement activities and thus to escape from the tax. Second, since sector 2 is
constrained by the higher cost of its abatement technology, its fiscal contribution as well
as its total burden are larger or equal than the total burden of sector 1 even if pollutive
intensities and demand functions are the same for both sectors.
6 Conclusion
In a Hotelling depletion model, we have determined the optimal exploitation time paths of
two energy resources, one being depletable and carbon-emitting, the other being renewable
and carbon-free, by two sectors that are heterogeneous regarding their respective abatement
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capacities. The optimal paths have been considered along with the following features.
First, sector 1 is able to abate its carbon emissions, but not sector 2. Second, to reduce
pollution, sector 2 can only have recourse to the atmospheric capture technology, which
is highly more expensive than the emission capture. Third, the cumulative atmospheric
carbon stock is set not to exceed some critical threshold.
We have shown that the optimal path requires that emission abatement by sector 1
must be undertaken before the point of time at which the atmospheric carbon stock reaches
its critical threshold and that sector 1's emissions must be wholly abated. This first result
contrasts with the results established by Chakravorty el al. (2006-b) in a model with a
single energy using sector and a single abatement technology. It can thus be explained
by the assumption of heterogeneity introduced here, which constraints the potential of
emission capture to be at the most equal to the sole emissions of sector 1 and then to be
always smaller the total carbon emissions of fossil energy users.
Heterogeneity means that the abatement costs are not the same for all the energy
users. This is the crucial assumption generating the early and full abatement of sector 1's
potential emissions. Clearly in the present model we could have assumed that the sector
2 can abate its emissions at the marginal cost ca instead of having to capture the carbon
in the atmosphere. The reason is that the flow of carbon captured in the atmosphere
is lower than the potential carbon emission flow of sector 2 when carbon is captured in
the atmosphere. Thus would the carbon be captured from sector 2's emissions at the
marginal cost ca the result would be the same, that is the optimal price paths, optimal
sectoral consumption paths and captured carbon paths by the two abatement technologies
would be the same. To reinforce the heterogeneity argument, we show in a companion
paper (Amigues et al., 2010) that, when all the energy consumers have access to the same
abatement costs, then even learning by doing in the abatement technology does not justify
to begin to abate too early, that is before being at the ceiling10.
Finally, atmospheric carbon capture by sector 2 is implemented only once the ceiling is
reached and sector 2's intensity of abatement is always smaller than its real contribution
to the common atmospheric carbon accumulation, which is now in accordance with the
results of Chakravorty et al. (2006-b).
10However, note that the time at which Z(t) reaches its critical level Z¯ is endogenous. Thus learning by
doing is not without effect on this date.
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Figure 1: Optimal path along which it is optimal to abate before the ceiling, but not from
the beginning of the planning horizon
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not optimal to abate sector 1's emissions
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